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European Criminal Law and General Principles of Union Law 
 




 1. Introduction: the ECJ and General Principles of Community Law 
 
The European Court of Justice, partly followed in this by the European legisla-
tor, has regulated Community law and policy through a set of general 
principles of law. For the Community legal order in the first pillar, general legal 
principles have developed from functional policy areas such as the internal 
market, the customs union, the monetary union, the common agricultural 
policy, the European competition policy, etc., which are of great importance 
for the quality and legitimacy of Community law. The principles in question are 
not so much general legal principles of an institutional character, such as the 
priority of Community law, direct effect or Community loyalty, but rather 
principles of law which shape the fundamental rights and basic rights of the 
citizen. I refer to the principle of legality, of nulla poena, the inviolability of the 
home, the nemo tenetur principle, due process, the rights of the defence, etc. 
Many of these legal principles have been elevated to primary Community law 
status by the European Court of Justice, often as a result of preliminary 
questions. Nevertheless, a considerable number of them have also been 
elaborated in the context of contentious proceedings before the Court of 
Justice, such as in the framework of European competition law and European 
public servants law. 
 The European Court of Justice has introduced fundamental rights, including 
the legal guarantees in criminal and punitive law, into Community law by way 
of the general principles of Community law. Some of them have meanwhile 
also been consolidated by the legislator in primary and/or secondary 
Community law. Through this, the Court and the legislator have not only 
regulated the Community acts of the European institutions, but also the acts 
of the Member States in the application and enforcement of Community law. 
                                                          
1 Professor in economic and financial criminal law at the Faculty of Law in Utrecht (Netherlands) and 
Professor in European criminal law at the College of Europe in Bruges (Belgium). 
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Given the fact that the enforcement in the Member States of much of 
Community law takes place by means of criminal law and/or punitive law, 
these principles also have a direct effect on national criminal law and/or 
punitive law. 
 The European Court of Justice has to a considerable extent been urged to 
its elaboration of the general principles of law and thus to the guaranteeing of 
a minimum level of fundamental rights protection by the case law of the 
Constitutional Courts and Councils of State in Italy, France and Germany, 
especially after the Court of Justice came to the conclusion in its decision in 
Stork2 that Community law cannot be tested against national fundamental 
rights. The German Bundesverfassungsgericht considered that this 
undermined the national protection of fundamental rights and in Solange I3 
declared itself competent to test secondary Community law against the 
fundamental rights contained in the German Constitution until such a time as 
the Community would have developed a catalogue of fundamental rights with 
an equivalent value to German fundamental rights 
 The Court of Justice has clearly understood the message and has filled the 
gap left by the lack of a catalogue of fundamental rights with case law by 
means of the general principles of Community law and has in this way 
managed to develop an equivalent standard to that prevailing in the Member 
States. For this reason, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht has reviewed 
its opinion in Solange II4 and has recognized the priority of Community law 
also over national fundamental rights, for as long as the level of built-up 
fundamental rights protection is at the least maintained. 
 
2. The Third Pillar and the Position of the ECJ 
 
Evidently, the third pillar presents a completely different picture. I say evi-
dently, as the pillar structure was created as a political compromise after the 
failed attempts of a number of Member States to secure a specific position 
within the Community’s integration policy for policy concerning justice, domes-
                                                          
2 ECJ, 4 February 1959, Stork/High Authority, (1959) ECR 17. 
3 Bundesverfassungsgericht 25 July 1979, BverfGE, 37, 271 and C.M.L.Rep. 1974, 540. 
4 Bundesverfassungsgericht 22 October 1986 (Solange II). 
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tic affairs, foreign affairs and security. First of all, the jurisdiction of the Court 
of Justice is not the same as within the first pillar. Only with great difficulty did 
the Court of Justice manage to secure a place in the European Union’s third-
pillar law. Upon the creation of the third pillar by the Maastricht Treaty the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice was still entirely optional. The Court of 
Justice could only obtain jurisdiction if a specific third-pillar Convention 
expressly provided for such jurisdiction. This resulted in a fragmented and ad 
hoc approach and in heated debate over each separate instrument. The issue 
at hand especially delayed the adoption of the third-pillar Convention 
concerning Europol, now that among others the Dutch Parliament threatened 
not to ratify the Convention if no jurisdiction of the Court of Justice was 
provided for. This political debate led to a compromise which formed the basis 
for the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction under the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
 By now the Court of Justice does have the power to answer preliminary 
questions, although he power to submit such questions has in a number of 
Member States been limited to courts deciding in the final instance. Moreover, 
the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to review the legality of framework deci-
sions and decisions, but only in actions brought by a Member State or the 
Commission. Several actions and remedies under Community law are not 
included in the EU, as for instance the action against EU institutions for failure 
to act, or the action against Member States for infringements of EU law, such 
as, for instance, for not implementing (in due time, or in substance) framework 
decisions. However, in sum it can be stated that the jurisdiction of the ECJ 
has been strengthened under the Treaty of Amsterdam, in such a way that the 
Court has sufficient room for manoeuvre to elaborate general principles of 
European Union law, awaiting the coming into force of the Constitutional 
Treaty. Moreover, the ECJ has already made a start with this process by 
deciding the first leading cases.5 
 Secondly, it can be stated that initially optional jurisdiction was somewhat 
understandable given the strongly intergovernmental character of the third 
pillar. However, ever since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam it is 
quite obvious that the third pillar is fully-fledged European Union law and thus 
                                                          
5 See infra, point 5.  
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subject to the particularities of European Union law insofar as these deviate 
from international law. In that sense it is quite surprising that in 2004 some 
Member States still argued before the Court of Justice that third-pillar law is 
intergovernmental law that is governed by international law and is therefore 
removed from the application of general principles of European Union law.6 It 
is to be expected that the Court of Justice will reject this line of reasoning and 
will elaborate some general legal European Union principles based on the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
 Thirdly, the European Union has not – or rather: not yet – been given an 
ultimatum by the national judiciary. We are still awaiting decisions along the 
lines of Solange. That these have not yet emerged may be explained from the 
fact that before the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam binding third-
pillar law was restricted to Convention law. The framework decisions have 
given rise to an entirely different legal situation and even though the Treaty 
itself denies them direct effect, it is crystal clear that framework decisions, 
such as the one concerning the European arrest warrant, will give rise to 
constitutional court decisions in the Member States which could find 
themselves on a tense footing with the content of the framework decision and 
with the concept of mutual recognition which was developed into a key 
concept for judicial cooperation in the Tampere conclusions. Full mutual 
recognition presupposes ‘reconnaissance de plein droit’, ipso iure. This leads 
to the prohibition of testing on the merits in the country of execution, makes 
an exequatur procedure unnecessary and considerably reduces the number 
of grounds for refusal. Mutual recognition presupposes mutual trust in each 
other’s legal systems and legal acts. Mutual trust is associated with 
international or transnational comity and non-inquiry. The executive 
authorities do not ask questions concerning the legal quality of the requesting 
state or of the request. Legality and legitimacy are presupposed to exist ipso 
iure and are thereby removed from judicial testing in the requested state. It is 
true that in practice many new framework decisions for the implementation of 
the Tampere programme are based on mutual recognition, but in respect of 
their content they are still a compromise between the old, conventional 
                                                          
6 See infra, point 4.2, conclusions of AG J. Kokott in Case C-105/03, criminal proceedings against M. 
Pupino, No. 22.  
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approach to judicial cooperation and the new mutual recognition approach. 
Many compulsory and optional grounds for exception which provide room for 
the Member States to conduct a policy of their own are still built into the 
framework decisions. This room can of course also be used to bring national 
fundamental rights to the fore, especially in the area of the quality of criminal 
justice in the requesting state. This, too, might of course give rise to 
interesting legal disputes which may end up before the Court of Justice. If the 
Court of Justice is unable or not able in time to outline the general principles 
of law, a decision along the lines of Solange in the field of Justice and Home 
Affairs cannot be ruled out. In the transition to the Constitutional Treaty, and 
thus to the full jurisdiction of the ECJ, the ECJ will do everything in its power 
to bridge the gap. 
 
3. Justice Integration: Effective and Fair Law Enforcement in the EU 
 
In international law states still have difficulty accepting that individuals are 
subjects of international law, rather than mere objects of international law.7 It 
is even more difficult for them to accept that individuals have subjective rights 
deriving from human rights conventions, not only in the territory of each indi-
vidual state, but also in the common area of the contracting states. To what 
extent are states really prepared to assume responsibility when they have 
effective control or when they exercise power and authority over persons? It is 
quite clear that under international law it is very difficult to establish a joint res-
ponsibility for human rights violations. 
 However, in a common Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, one might 
expect to find a political-legal project of a much more developed justice 
integration approach than in international law. Article 1(2) of the EU Treaty 
stresses the importance of the process of creating an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe. One could legitimately expect that in such a 
common judicial area at least the minimum norms of the ECHR and of ECtHR 
case law are fulfilled and that compliance in transnational relations is not 
limited to gross violations of human rights, as is the case with the European 
                                                          
7 See the contribution by A. Smeulers supra, p. ??? 
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arrest warrant. In fact, the draft framework decision for the European evidence 
warrant does not even include a human rights clause at all. One should be 
able to expect that the ECHR is respected to the fullest possible extent, in 
such a way that the protection which is granted in the internal legal orders of 
the Member States is assimilated at the level of transnational relations and 
that no loss of legal guarantees therefore occurs for the citizen in 
transnational dealings. In practice, however, states qualify transnational acts 
of justice as governmental acts which are not subject to judicial testing and 
whereby they take mutual trust and non-inquiry as starting points, which has 
the consequence of creating a Delaware effect and considerably lowers the 
protection of fundamental rights in transnational relations. 
 For this reason, it is absolutely essential to break this pattern of non-inquiry 
and to insert a public order clause or human rights clause in the framework 
decisions, which permits the courts in the requested state to test the legality of 
the request.8 I expressly argue in favour of reserving this test for the courts, 
rather than to have it performed by the political authorities. This test does not 
have to lead to the reintroduction of the exequatur procedure and could take 
place by interlocutory or fast-track proceedings. Recently it proved possible 
for a request by the Spanish judicial authorities to the Belgian judicial 
authorities for the arrest and extradition of the Spanish married couple Garcia-
Moreno to be heard up to three times in record time by the Hof van Cassatie 
[Supreme Court]. 
 Why is this public order clause or human rights clause so important and 
why is it not superfluous in the case of mutual recognition? This is best 
illustrated by an example from private international law, the 
Krombach/Bamberski case.9 After having received medical treatment in 
Germany from Mr Krombach, a French girl died. In Germany, the case was 
dropped. However, the victim’s family deposited a criminal and civil complaint 
against Mr Krombach in France. Both aspects were investigated by the 
French juge d’instruction. The French Court assumed jurisdiction on the basis 
                                                          
8 Cf. also A.H. van Hoek & M. Luchtman, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and transna-
tional cooperation in criminal matters’, in A.H. van Hoek et al., Multilevel governance and one level 
citizen. 
9 A.H. van Hoek, Case C-7/98, D. Krombach v. A. Bamberski, Judgment of the Full Court of 28 
March, (2000) ECR I-1395.  
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of the nationality of the victim. The accused doctor became afraid to travel to 
France for fear of being arrested. He appointed a barrister, but because of the 
accused’s absence, the barrister was unable to play any role of significance in 
the French criminal procedure. The doctor was sentenced in absentia 
(jugement par contumace) to 15 years’ imprisonment and by default to 
payment of considerable damages. The French authorities requested the 
German authorities to execute the civil law part of the judgment. This led to 
legal proceedings in Germany up to the level of the Bundesgerichtshof which 
submitted preliminary questions to the Court of Justice. The 
Bundesgerichtshof defined the right to a lawyer as an essential part of a fair 
trial and the absence of one as a violation of a substantial norm of German 
procedural law, to the extent that it belongs to the German ordre public. The 
question was, however, whether this national public order is acceptable under 
the public policy clause in Article 27(1) of the Brussels Convention. Although 
the ECJ stressed that the Convention uses a narrow concept of public policy, 
it did accept that it can be used, if the infringement constitutes a manifest 
breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the state in 
which enforcement is sought or of a right recognized as being fundamental 
within that legal order. The Krombach case clearly indicates that the Court of 
Justice has an express role to play in further defining the transnational 
protection of fundamental rights. This elaboration of the concept cannot just 
be left to the national judicial authorities, as this would invite the risk of 
fragmentation as well as the danger of undermining the common EU 
instruments by an overly broad, nationally orientated definition of the ordres 
publics. It is up to the Court of Justice to draw the outlines of a European 
concept of ordre public, based on the material violation of fundamental rights. 
In its development of this concept the Court will evidently make use of Article 
8(2) EU. If the Constitutional Treaty enters into force, the Court can also make 
direct use of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This reasoning also applies 
to the proposed European evidence warrant which, although limited to 
evidence in real time, includes coercive measures. Here, too, mutual 
recognition depends on judicial scrutiny, under the control of the ECJ. 
 
 4. Analysis of the Case Law of the Court of Justice 
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The Court of Justice has not awaited the entry into force of the Constitutional 
Treaty and will not await it further to start drawing some outlines. The Court of 
Justice is clearly of the opinion that EU law is based on institutional principles 
of its own which deviate from international law. The Court of Justice is also 
aware of the political and legal dimension of the European judicial area. Up to 
now, the case law has been quite limited, but it is still punctuated by con-
siderations as to principles. Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01, Hüseyin Gözütok 
and Klaus Brügge, Judgment of the Court of Justice of 11 February 2003, 
ECR 2003, I-5689 and Case C-105/03, Criminal Procedure against Maria 
Pupino, deserve detailed discussion. 
 
 A. THE TRANSNATIONAL NE BIS IN IDEM PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN JUDICIAL AREA 
 
4.1  The ne bis in idem principle as regulatory instrument 
 
The ne bis in idem principle is a general principle of (criminal) law in many 
national legal orders, sometimes codified at constitutional level, like the 
double jeopardy clause in the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. The ne 
bis in idem principle has been historically elaborated as a principle that only 
applies nationally and is limited to criminal justice. Concerning the substance 
of the principle, traditionally a distinction is made between nemo debet bis 
vexari pro una et eadem causa (no one should have to face more than one 
prosecution for the same offence) and nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto 
(no one should be punished twice for the same offence). Some countries limit 
the principle to prohibition of double punishment.10 
 The rationale of the ne bis in idem principle is manifold. It is of course a 
principle of judicial protection for the citizen against the ius puniendi of the 
state, being part of the principles of due process and fair trial. On the other 
hand, the respect for the res judicata (pro veritate habitur) of the final 
                                                          
10 In that case, a double prosecution can still be recognized as a violation of the principles of fair 
administration of justice.  
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judgments11 is an important factor for the legitimacy of the legal system and 
the legitimacy of the state. 
 The ne bis in idem principle raises many questions.12 Most of the case law 
in the different states is about the definition of idem and bis. Do we consider 
the legal definition of the offences or the set of facts (idem factum) as the 
basis for the definition of the same/idem? Does it depend on the scope of and 
the legal values to be protected by the legal provisions? Are natural and legal 
persons different persons for the application of the principle? Is the scope of 
the principle limited to double criminal sanctioning or does it also include other 
forms of punitive sanctions under private law or administrative law? What is a 
final judgment? Does it include acquittal or a dismissal of the charges? What 
does an enforced final judgment mean? Does it also concern final settlements 
by prosecuting or other judicial authorities out of court? Does the respect for 
the ne bis in idem principle require a bar on further prosecution or punishment 
(Erledigungsprinzip), or can the authority impose a second punishment taking 
into account the first punishment (Anrechnungsprinzip)? 
 
4.2  The ne bis in idem principle: domestic and international application 
 
Traditionally, the ne bis in idem principle is recognized by the states for 
application in their own domestic legal order. Generally speaking, the principle 
only applies in the field of criminal law and to final judgments in criminal 
matters. That means that double prosecution remains fully possible, as does 
the combination of administrative punitive sanctions with criminal sanctions. 
Also is it possible to combine criminal sanctions with out of court settlements. 
Finally, some states do not apply the ne bis in idem fully, by barring the 
second punishment, but do take into account the first sanction when imposing 
or executing the second one (Anrechnungsprinzip). 
 Very few countries recognize the validity of foreign judgments in criminal 
matters for execution or enforcement in the national legal order without a 
treaty basis. States do consider their ius puniendi and the full exercise of it as 
                                                          
11 Interest reipublice ut sit finis litium,bis de eadem re ne sit actio. 
12 See for instance the Report of the UK Law Commission on double jeopardy, 17.24.01, 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/ 
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essential to their sovereignty. Even the recognition of res judicata to a foreign 
criminal judgment is problematic, certainly when it concerns territorial 
offences. Besides self-interest, states do not always have sufficient 
confidence and trust in the other state’s administration of justice. Recognition 
of foreign res judicata means that a new prosecution or punishment is barred 
(negative effect) or that the decision is taken into account in the context of 
other cases to be judged (positive effect). The refusal to recognize the validity 
of foreign judgments leads to multiple prosecution, which is certainly 
problematic for the individual, but can also be problematic for the international 
relationships between states. Most common law legal systems do recognize 
the res judicata effect of foreign judgments. In the civil law system the 
Netherlands certainly has the most far-reaching and liberal provisions. The 
Dutch Criminal Code contains a general ne bis in idem provision that is 
applicable to domestic and foreign judgements, regardless of the place where 
the offence was committed.13 However, the Netherlands stand quite alone in 
this respect. 
 There is no rule of international law (ius cogens) imposing the international 
ne bis in idem between states. The application depends upon the content of 
international treaties. We may find treaty based ne bis in idem provisions both 
in human rights treaties as in bilateral or multilateral treaties dealing with judi-
cial cooperation in criminal matters. 
 The ne bis in idem principle is established as an individual right in interna-
tional human rights legal instruments, such as the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights of 19 December 1966 (Article 14(7)). The European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not contain such a provision and 
the former European Commission on Human Rights14 denied the existence of 
the principle as such under Article 6 of the ECHR, without however precluding 
in absolute terms that certain double prosecutions might violate the fair trial 
rights under Article 6 ECHR. The provision was elaborated in the Seventh 
Protocol to the ECHR (Article 4), but only a minority of the 25 EU Member 
States have ratified Protocol no 7. However, the case law could be inspiring. 
                                                          
13 For a comment on the Dutch ne bis in idem in Art. 68 of the Criminal Code, see P. Baauw, ‘Ne bis in 
idem’, in B. Swart and A. Klip (eds.), International Criminal Law in the Netherlands, MPI, Freiburg im 
Breisgau, 1997, 75-84. 
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Most of the cases are about the definition of idem. After some contradictory 
judgments15 on the application of Article 4 of Protocol 7, the ECtHR 
proceeded to follow its judgment in Franz Fischer v. Austria,16 which was 
based on idem factum, but in the case of Göktan v. France17 the Court again 
seems to rely on the legal idem. Although the case law is limited, some 
conclusions can be derived from it. The ECHR only deals with the national ne 
bis in idem, meaning within the domestic legal order of the Party States, not 
with the international or transnational ne bis in idem. This is in line with the 
application of Article 14(7) of the UN International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.18 It is also clear from the Strasbourg case law that the ne bis 
in idem principle is not limited to double punishment, but includes double 
prosecution, which also means that the accounting principle is not enough to 
respect the ne bis in idem. This underlines the importance of cooperating at 
the level of the inquiry and to introduce una via provisions, rather than anti-
cumulation of sanctions. Second, the bis also includes the combination of two 
criminal charges in the sense of Article 6, meaning for instance the imposition 
of a criminal punitive sanction and an administrative punitive sanction.19 
 The ne bis in idem principle is also important as a ground for refusal to co-
operate in the framework of international treaties dealing with judicial coopera-
                                                                                                                                                                      
14 European Commission on Human Rights, 13 July 1970, Application 4212/69, CDR 35, 151.  
15 Gradinger v. Austria, judgment of 23 October 1995, Series A no 328-C and Oliveira v. Switzerland, 
judgment of 30 July 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-V, p. 1990. 
16 Franz Fischer v. Austria of 29 May 2001, Series A no 312 (C), confirmed in W.F. v. Austria, 
judgment of 30 May 2002, and Sailer v. Austria, judgment of 6 June 2002. See 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ for these decisions.  
17 Göktan v. France, Judgment of 2 July 2002, http://www.echr.coe.int/  
18 The Human Rights Committee ruled that Article 14(7) does not apply to foreign res judicata, UN 
Human Rights Committee, 2 November 1987. The Netherlands has formulated the following 
reservation: 
‘Article 14, paragraph 7 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands accepts this provision only insofar as no obligations arise from it 
further to those set out in article 68 of the Criminal Code of the Netherlands and article 70 of the 
Criminal Code of the Netherlands Antilles as they now apply. They read: 
1. Except in cases where court decisions are eligible for review, no person may be prosecuted 
again for an offence in respect of which a court in the Netherlands or the Netherlands Antilles has 
delivered an irrevocable judgement. 
2. If the judgement has been delivered by some other court, the same person may not be 
prosecuted for the same of fence in the case of (I) acquittal or withdrawal of proceedings or (II) 
conviction followed by complete execution, remission or lapse of the sentence.’ 
19 The double jeopardy clause in the Fifth Amendment is not limited to criminal law, but does include 
civil and administrative punitive sanctions. However, recently the leading case, United States v. 
Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), was again somewhat restricted in Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93 (1997); 
See also Vervaele, J.A.E., ‘La saisie et la confiscation à la suite d’atteintes punissables au droit aux 
Etats-Unis’, Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie, 1998, 974-1003. 
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tion in criminal matters. The ne bis in idem principle was included in the mile-
stone multilateral treaty on Extradition of the Council of Europe of 13 
December 1957. Article 9 provided not only for the classic formulation of the 
ne bis in idem, dealing with final judgments (res judicata), but also included 
final decisions of a procedural character. The former ground for refusal is 
mandatory, while the latter is optional. Article 8 also includes an optional ne 
bis in idem ground for refusal concerning lis pendens. The Extradition 
Convention deals with ne bis in idem in a classic intergovernmental setting 
between the requesting and requested state. 
 Ne bis in idem provisions are not limited to extradition, but have been in-
cluded in many Council of Europe Conventions concerning judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. In Europe efforts have been made since the 
1970s, in the framework of the Council of Europe, to introduce a regional 
international ne bis in idem principle. As such, ne bis in idem is provided for 
under the 1970 Convention of the Council of Europe on the International 
Validity of Criminal Judgments (Articles 53-57) and under the 1972 
Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters (Articles 35-
37) as mandatory. However, both these Conventions have a rather poor 
ratification rate and contain quite a lot of exceptions to the ne bis in idem 
principle. In the 1990 Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (Article 18(1e)), which was ratified 
by a large number of signatories, the principle is optional, but some 
Contracting States did include it in their ratification declaration as a ground for 
refusal of cooperation requests. In these Conventions the ne bis in idem 
principle has the objective of avoiding double punishment, but not double 
prosecution or investigation. That is the reason why we do not find any ne bis 
in idem provisions in the Council of Europe Convention of 20 April 1959 on 
mutual assistance in criminal matters or in the additional protocols dealing 
with judicial letters rogatory. 
 Even if states recognize the international ne bis in idem principle, problems 
can arise in international settings because of the different interpretations of 
the principle concerning idem, bis, etc. Is the ECtHR dealing with these 
questions and can the individual claim the application of the ne bis in idem 
principle as a subjective right or even a human right? Does the ne bis in idem 
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principle serves as an impediment to international cooperation in general and 
to the surrender of suspects in particular or is it a human right of the accused? 
In the cooperation framework the ne bis in idem principle only applies inter 
partes, meaning that it can be or must be applied between the contracting 
states in a concrete request. It is not considered an individual right erga 
omnes. However, this state-to-state approach has meanwhile been affected 
by case law of the ECtHR.20 In the Soering case,21 the ECtHR decided on the 
conformity with Articles 3 and 6 ECHR of an extradition of a suspect to the 
USA. It ruled that although Article 1 of the ECHR, which provides that ‘the 
High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention’, cannot be read 
as justifying a general principle to the effect that a Contracting State may not 
surrender an individual unless satisfied that the conditions awaiting him in the 
country of destination are in full accordance with each of the safeguards of the 
Convention, this does not absolve the Contracting Parties from responsibility 
under that Convention for all and any foreseeable consequences outside their 
jurisdiction.22 From this decision it is quite clear that the rule of comity and 
non-inquiry does not apply in the case of possible flagrant violations of human 
rights. The requested state has the duty to scrutiny as to whether the 
requesting state properly respects these rights. Further the respect of human 
rights is a joined responsibility of both states and citizens are entitled to an 
effective remedy in this field. This means that the extradition procedure not 
only affects state-state relations, but also the subjective rights of citizens. Also 
in the cases Droz v. France and Spain23 and Iribarne Perex v. France,24 which 
both concerned international execution of criminal convictions, the ECtHR 
ruled that Contracting States are obliged to refuse cooperation if it emerges 
that the conviction is the result of a flagrant denial of justice. 
 
                                                          
20 See P. Garlick, ‘The European arrest warrant and the ECHR’ and N. Keijzer, ‘Extradition and 
Human Rights: a Dutch Perspective’, in R. Blekxtoon & W. van Ballegooij, Handbook on the 
European arrest warrant, T.M.C Asser Press, The Hague, 2004, 167-194. 
21 ECtHR, 7 July 1989, Soering v. U.K, , A 161.  
22 Paragraph 86.  
23 ECtHR, 26 June 1992, Drozd v. France and Spain.  
24 ECtHR, 24 October 1995, Iribarne v. France.  
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4.3  Regional integration in the EU and the transnational application of the ne 
bis in idem principle 
 
  4.3.1  Transnational application in the single market of the Community 
 
The importance of the ne bis in idem principle is certainly not limited to EU 
third-pillar law. Even before the coming into force of the Treaty of Maastricht, 
the ne bis in idem principle played a role in EC law. The EC has 
administrative sanctioning powers in the field of competition and far-reaching 
powers to harmonize national administrative sanctioning in many EC policies. 
The ECJ has paid attention to the ne bis in idem principle in the field of 
competition.25 Under Regulation 17/62,26 the ECJ held already in 1969 in 
Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt27 that double prosecutions, one by the 
Commission and one by national authorities, were in line with the Regulation 
and did not violating the ne bis in idem principle, given the fact that the scope 
of the European and national regulatory provisions was different. However, if 
the result were to be the imposition of two consecutive sanctions, a general 
requirement of natural justice demands that any previous punitive decision 
must be taken into account in determining any sanction to be imposed 
(Anrechnungsprinzip). The ECJ over the years built up a longstanding 
tradition in confirming that the ne bis in idem principle, as enshrined in Article 
4 of Protocol 7, is a general principle of Community law,28 which means not 
limited to criminal sanctions and applied in competition matters. However, it 
seems that the ECJ limits the ne bis in idem principle to double punishment, 
and accepts the Anrechnungsprinzip. This problem has not been solved in the 
                                                          
25 Wouter P.J. Wils, ‘The principle of “ne bis in idem”’ in EC Antitrust Enforcement: a Legal and 
Economic Analysis, World Competition, volume 26, Issue 2, June 2003.  
26 Regulation 17/62, OJ P 013, 21/02/1962, p. 0204-0211, English special edition: Series 1 Chapter 
1959-1962 p. 0087. 
27 Judgment of 13 February 1969, ECR (1969) 3.  
28 See for instance Judgment of 14/12/1972, Boehringer Mannheim v. Commission (Rec.1972, p. 
1281) (DK1972/00323 GR1972-1973/00313 P 1972/00447 ES1972/00261 SVII/00061 FIII/00059) 
and Judgment of the Court of 15 October 2002, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV (LVM) (C-238/99 
P), DSM NV and DSM Kunststoffen BV (C-244/99 P), Montedison SpA (C-245/99 P), Elf Atochem 
SA (C-247/99 P), Degussa AG (C-250/99 P), Enichem SpA (C-251/99 P), Wacker-Chemie GmbH 
and Hoechst AG (C-252/99 P) and Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) (C-254/99 P) v. 
Commission of the European Communities. 
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new competition Regulation 1/2003.29 This Regulation provides that, beside 
the European Commission, also national competition authorities shall apply 
the European competition rules, including the enforcement rules (Article 35). 
The European Commission and the national authorities will form a network 
based on close cooperation. In practice, conflict of jurisdiction and problems 
with ne bis in idem should be avoided though best practices of cooperation, 
after which competition authorities can suspend or terminate their 
proceedings (Article 13). There is however no obligation to do this, which 
means that double prosecution is not excluded as such. It is quite clear that 
the case law of the ECJ concerning international ne bis in idem in competition 
cases is not fully in line with the ECHR case law on the national ne bis in idem 
by precluding the double prosecution from the ne bis idem principle and by 
accepting the accounting principle. Finally, the transnational ne bis in idem 
principle only has effect in the territory of the Union. This means that a 
company can be sanctioned twice for violating different competition rules, e.g. 
by the competition authorities in the US and in Europe.30 
 The ne bis in idem rule can be of importance in other sectors in which the 
EC has sanctioning power, e.g. within the area of European public 
procurement.31 The EC has also harmonized sanctioning regimes in the 
Member States. The package on the protection of the financial interests of the 
EC is a good example. Member States are obliged to impose administrative 
and criminal sanctions upon irregularities and fraud. Article 6 of Regulation 
2988/9532 provides for the suspension of national administrative enforcement 
during criminal proceedings, but the administrative proceedings must be 
resumed when the criminal proceedings are concluded and the administrative 
authority must impose the prescribed administrative sanctions, including fines. 
The administrative authority may take into account any penalty imposed by 
the judicial authority on the same person in respect of the same facts. It is 
obvious that these provisions do not reflect the full effect of the ne bis in idem 
principle. Article 6 provides only that the reopening of the administrative 
                                                          
29 Regulation 1/2003, OJ L 001, 04/01/2003, p. 0001-0025, in force from 1 May 2004. 
30 Case T-223/00, Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co, Judgment of 9 July 2003, ECR (2003).  
31 Regulation 1605/2002, Articles 93-96, OJ L 248, 16/09/2002, p. 0001-0048 and Regulation 
2342/2002, Article 133, OJ L 357, 31/12/2002, p. 0001-0071. 
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proceedings after the criminal proceedings can by precluded by general legal 
principles. The ne bis in idem principle should bar the reopening if it concerns 
the same persons and the same facts, but the Regulation does not mention 
this explicitly. 
 
  4.3.2  Transnational application in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice 
 
European Justice Ministers were fully aware that the deepening and widening 
of the European integration also led to an increase of transborder crime and 
of transnational justice in Europe and that concurring prosecution and 
sanctioning would become an obstacle to justice integration. In the framework 
of the European Political Cooperation, before the coming into force of the 
Maastricht Treaty with the third pillar on Justice and Home Affairs, they 
elaborated the 1987 Convention between the Member States of the EC on 
Double Jeopardy, which deals with the ne bis in idem principle in a 
transnational setting in the EC. The Convention has been poorly ratified,33 but 
its substance has been integrated in the 1990 Convention implementing the 
Schengen Agreement (hereinafter CISA), which for that reason can be 
qualified as the first multilateral convention establishing an international ne bis 
in idem principle as an individual right erga omnes. 
 The Schengen provisions served as a model for several ne bis in idem 
provisions in the EU instruments on Justice and Home Affairs.34 The 
Convention on the Financial Protection of the European Communities and its 
several protocols contain several provisions on ne bis idem.35 So does the 
Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the 
European Communities or Officials of Member States of the European 
                                                                                                                                                                      
32 Regulation 2988/95, OJ L 312, 23/12/1995, p. 0001-0004. 
33 The ne bis in idem Convention has been ratified by Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Portugal and is provisionally applied between them.  
34 H.H. Kühne, ‘Ne bis in idem in den Schengener Vertragsstaaten’, J.Z., 1998, 876-880, W. 
Schomburg, ‘Die Europäisierung des Verbots doppelter Strafverfolgung – Ein Zwischenbericht’, 
N.J.W. 2000, 1833-1840 and C. Van den Wyngaert and G. Stessens, ‘The international non bis in 
idem principle: Resolving some of the unanswered questions’, I.C.LQ., 1999, 786-788.  
35 See Article 7 of the Convention, OJ 1996 C 313/3. 
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Union.36 The Corpus Juris37 on European Criminal Law does not provide for a 
specific transnational ne bis in idem provision, but in Article 17 deals with the 
problem in the framework of concurring incriminations, as far as double 
criminal sanctioning is concerned, and imposes the accounting principle 
where a criminal sanction is imposed subsequent to an administrative 
sanction. 
 The CISA has been an important landmark for the establishment of a multi-
lateral-treaty-based, international principle of ne bis in idem. Although the 
CISA was very much linked with the internal market and the four freedoms, it 
was an intergovernmental instrument. With the coming into force of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam in May 1999, the EU was very much aware of the necessity to 
provide for a transnational ne bis in idem principle in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. Provisions in international treaties governing the 
principle were too different and the application of them in the Member States 
varied too much. Point 49(e) of the Action Plan of the Council and the 
Commission on the implementation of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice38 provides that measures will be established within five years of the 
entry into force of the Treaty ‘for the coordination of criminal investigations 
and prosecutions in progress in the Member States with the aim of preventing 
duplication and contradictory rulings, taking account of better use of the ne bis 
in idem principle’. In the Programme of Measures to implement the principle of 
mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters,39 the ne bis in idem 
principle is included among the immediate priorities of the EU and reference is 
inter alia made to the problem of out-of-court settlement. In effect, it became 
clear through national case law that national courts had problems with the 
transactions and the application of the Schengen provisions on the 
transnational ne bis in idem. Meanwhile the relevant Schengen provisions 
were and are in force, however, no longer as provisions in a governmental 
setting, but as provisions integrated in the third-pillar provisions of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice. That means that the Tampere Conclusions of 
                                                          
36 OJ 1997 C 195/1, Article 10.  
37 M. Delmas-Marty & J.A.E. Vervaele (eds.), The Implementation of the Corpus Juris in the Member 
States, vol. 1-4, Intersentia, Antwerpen-Groningen, Oxford 2000-2001, 394 p. 
38 OJ C 19, 23.01.1999.  
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the special European Council40 defining mutual recognition as the cornerstone 
of judicial cooperation in criminal matters also apply to the former Schengen 
provisions. 
 
4.4  Ne bis in idem, the ECJ and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
 
In the joined cases Gözütok and Brügge, national courts referred to the ECJ 
for a preliminary ruling under Article 35 EU on the interpretation of Article 54 
of the CISA, raising interesting questions concerning the validity and the 
scope of a leading principle of human rights, the ne bis in idem principle or the 
prohibition of double jeopardy in the EU/Schengen context. This was the first 
preliminary ruling on the Schengen acquis.41 
 
4.4.1  Facts 
 
Mr Gözütok, a Turkish national who had been living in the Netherlands for 
several years, was suspected of the possession of illegal quantities of soft 
drugs. In the course of searches of his coffee and teahouse in 1996, the 
Dutch police did indeed find several kilos of hashish and marijuana. The 
criminal proceedings against Mr Gözütok were discontinued because of the 
fact that he accepted a so-called transactie proposed by the Dutch Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, as provided for in Article 74(1) of the Dutch Criminal 
Code:  
 
 ‘The Public Prosecutor, prior to the trial, may set one or more conditions in order to 
avoid criminal proceedings for serious offences – excluding serious offences for which the 
law prescribes sentences of imprisonment of more than six years – and for lesser 
offences. The right to prosecute lapses where the conditions are met’.  
 
Mr Gözütok paid the sums of NLG 3 000 and NLG 750 in the framework of the 
transactie. The German authorities’ attention was drawn to Mr Gözütok by the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
39 OJ C 12, 15.01.2001.  
40 Tampere Conclusions, 15 and 16 October 1999, http://ue.eu.int. 
41 Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01, Hüseyin Gözütok and Klaus Brügge, Judgment of the Court of 
Justice of 11 February 2003, ECR 2003, I-5689. 
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notification of a German Bank of suspicious transactions to the German 
financial intelligence unit, set up in the framework of the EC obligations in 
connection with the fight against money laundering.42 The German authorities 
obtained further information concerning the alleged offences from the Dutch 
authorities and decided to arrest Mr Gözütok and to prosecute him for dealing 
in narcotics in the Netherlands. In 1997, the District Court of Aachen in 
Germany convicted Mr Gözütok and sentenced him to a period of one year 
and five months’ imprisonment, suspended on probation. Both the convicted 
and the Public Prosecutor’s Office lodged appeals. The Regional Court of 
Aachen discontinued the criminal proceedings brought against Mr Gözütok on 
the ground inter alia that under Article 54 of the CISA the German prosecuting 
authorities are bound by the definitive discontinuance of the criminal 
proceedings by the Netherlands. In a second appeal by the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office to the Higher Regional Court, the Court decided to stay 
proceedings and refer to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the basis of 
Article 35 EU. 
 Mr Brügge, a German national living in Germany, was charged by the Bel-
gian prosecution authorities with having intentionally assaulted and wounded 
Mrs Leliaert in Belgium, a violation under several articles of the Belgian Crimi-
nal Code. Mr Brügge faced a double criminal investigation, one in Belgium 
and one in Germany. In the Belgian criminal proceedings, the District Court 
had to deal with both the criminal and civil aspects of the case, due to the fact 
that Mrs Leliaert, who had become ill and unable to work because of the 
assault, as a civil party claimed pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. In the 
course of the proceedings at the District Court of Veurne in Belgium, the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office in Bonn in Germany offered to Mr Brügge an out-of-
court settlement in return for payment of DEM 1 000, in accordance with 
Paragraph 153a read together with the second sentence of Paragraph 153(1) 
of the German Code of Criminal Procedure. The District Court of Veurne 
decided to stay proceedings and refer to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on 
the basis of Article 35 EU. 
                                                          
42 Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for 




  4.4.2  Legal background and the preliminary questions 
 
In Gözütok, the German Higher Regional Court referred to the ECJ the 
following questions for a preliminary ruling:  
 
 ‘Is there a bar to prosecution in the Federal Republic of Germany under Article 54 of 
the Schengen Implementation Convention if, under Netherlands law, a prosecution on the 
same facts is barred in the Netherlands? In particular, is there a bar to prosecution where 
a decision by the Public Prosecutor’s Office to discontinue proceedings after the fulfilment 
of the conditions imposed (transactie under Netherlands law), which under the law of other 
Contracting States requires judicial approval, bars prosecution before a Netherlands 
court?’ 
 
In Brügge, the Belgian District Court referred to the ECJ the following question 
for a preliminary ruling:  
 
 ‘Under Article 54 of the Schengen Implementation Convention is the Belgian Public 
Prosecutor’s Office permitted to require a German national to appear before a Belgian 
criminal court and be convicted on the same facts as those in respect of which the 
German Public Prosecutor’s Office has made him an offer, by way of a settlement, to 
discontinue the case after payment of a certain sum, which was paid by the accused?’  
 
Given the similarity of the substance of the questions, the cases were joined 
and examined together. 
 Articles 54 to 58 of the CISA on the application of the ne bis in idem rule 
are incorporated in Title VI of the Treaty on EU (third-pillar provisions) on the 
legal basis of Article 34 EU and 31 EU.43 Article 54 provides:  
 
 ‘A person whose trial has been finally disposed of in one Contracting Party may not be 
prosecuted in another Contracting Party for the same acts provided that, if a penalty has 
been imposed, it has been enforced, is actually in the process of being enforced or can no 
longer be enforced under the laws of the sentencing Contracting Party.’  
 
                                                          
43 Council Decision 1999/436/EC of 20 May 1999, OJ L 176, 10/07/1999 p. 0017-0030. 
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Article 55 stipulates exceptions to the rule of ne bis in idem, but they must be 
formally laid down at the moment of signature or ratification. One of the 
possible exceptions is that the acts took place in whole or in part in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party. Another relevant provision in this 
context is Article 58, which stipulates that national provisions may go beyond 
the Schengen provisions on ne bis in idem, by affording broader protection. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam has extended the jurisdiction of the ECJ in third-
pillar matters, inter alia to give rulings on the validity and interpretation of 
framework decisions and decisions as well as implementing measures. 
Member States must accept that jurisdiction in accordance with Article 35(2) 
EU and they can, according to Article 35(3) EU, when accepting, choose 
between granting the power to refer questions for a preliminary ruling either to 
any of its courts or tribunals or only to those courts or tribunals which give a 
final decision against which there is no further judicial remedy. Both Germany 
and Belgium have opted for the full range of courts and tribunals, and the 
questions referred for a preliminary ruling do not affect public order or internal 
security, which areas are excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction (Article 35(5) 
EU). 
 
  4.4.3  Opinion of the Advocate General (AG) and interpretative answer 
of the ECJ 
 
The Advocate General opted for a strict interpretation of Article 35(1) EU, 
which would preclude any view being given on the application of the ne bis in 
idem principle to the case pending before the national court or with regard to 
the discontinuance of the criminal action. For this reason, the Advocate 
General stated that the ECJ must disregard the terms in which the German 
Higher Regional Court formulated the first of its questions, and he 
reformulated all the preliminary questions into two interpretative questions: 
 
 ‘1. The first is whether the ne bis in idem principle stated in Article 54 of the Convention 
also applies when in one of the signatory States a criminal action is extinguished as the 
result of a decision to discontinue proceedings, taken by the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
once the defendant has fulfilled the conditions imposed on him. 
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2. If the reply to the above question is positive, the German court wonders whether it is 
necessary for the decision taken by the Public Prosecutor’s Office to be approved by a 
court.’ 
 
The Advocate General qualified Article 54 as a genuine expression of the ne 
bis in idem principle in a dynamic process of European integration. It is not a 
procedural rule but a fundamental safeguard, based on legal certainty and 
equity, for persons who are subject to the exercise of the ius puniendi in a 
common area of freedom and justice. He was also of the opinion that the ne 
bis in idem principle is not only applicable within the framework of one 
particular legal system of a Member State. A strict application of national 
territoriality is incompatible with many situations in which there are elements 
of extra-territoriality and in which the same act may have legal effects in 
different parts of the territory of the Union. On the other hand, the ne bis in 
idem rule is also an expression of mutual trust of the Member States in their 
criminal justice systems. Penal settlements such as the Dutch transactie are 
not contractual, but an expression of criminal justice. They exist in many 
national legal orders, and are a form of administering justice that protects the 
rights of the accused and culminates in the imposition of a penalty. Since the 
rights of the individual are protected, it is irrelevant whether the decision to 
discontinue the criminal action is approved by a court. A verdict is given on 
the acts being judged and on the guilt of the perpetrator. It involves the 
delivery of an implicit final decision on the conduct of the accused and the 
imposition of penalizing measures. The rights of the victims are not affected, 
and they are not barred from claiming compensation. The phrasing of the 
Article 54 provision concerning the res iudicata is in the opinion of the 
Advocate General not homogeneous in the various language versions (finally 
disposed of, rechtskräftig abgeurteilt, onherroepelijk vonnis, définitivement 
jugée, juzgada en sentencia firme...). The Member States are not in 
agreement on this point. France, Germany and Belgium are in favour of a 
restrictive interpretation limited to court decisions; the Netherlands and Italy, 
joined also by the European Commission, plead for a more extensive 
interpretation, including out-of-court judicial settlements. The Advocate 
General emphasized that the terms used by the various versions are not 
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homogeneous and that a strict interpretation, limited to court judgments, may 
have absurd consequences that are contrary to reason and logic. Two 
persons suspected of the same offence could face a different application of 
the ne bis in idem principle if the one is acquitted in a final judgment and the 
other accepts an out-of-court settlement. 
 
The Advocate General concluded: 
 
 ‘The ne bis in idem principle stated in Article 54 of the Convention implementing the 
Schengen Agreement on the gradual abolition of checks at the common borders also 
applies when criminal proceedings are discontinued under the legal system of one 
Contracting Party as the consequence of a decision taken by the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office, once the defendant has fulfilled certain conditions – and it is irrelevant whether that 
decision has to be approved by a court – provided that: 1. the conditions imposed are in 
the nature of a penalty; 2. the agreement presupposes an express or implied 
acknowledgement of guilt and, accordingly, contains an express or implied decision that 
the act is culpable; and 3. the agreement does not prejudice the victim and other injured 
parties, who may be entitled to bring civil actions.’ 
 
The Court of Justice not only followed the rephrasing of the preliminary ques-
tions by the Advocate General, but also subscribed to his main arguments. 
The discontinuation of criminal proceedings is due to a decision of the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, and is part of the administration of criminal justice. The 
result of the procedure penalizes the unlawful conduct which the accused is 
alleged to have committed. The penalty is enforced for the purposes of Article 
54, and further prosecution is barred. The ECJ considered the ne bis in idem 
principle as a principle having proper effect, independent from matters of 
procedure or form, such as approval by a court. In the absence of an express 
indication to the contrary in Article 54, the principle of ne bis in idem must be 
regarded as sufficient to apply. The area of freedom, security and justice 
implies mutual trust in each other’s criminal justice systems. The validity of the 
ne bis in idem principle is not dependent upon further harmonization. 
 The arguments of Germany, Belgium and France that the wording and the 
general schema of Article 54, the relationship between Article 54 and the Arti-
cles 55 and 58, the intentions of the Contracting Parties and certain other 
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international provisions with a similar purpose, preclude Article 54 from being 
construed in such a way as to apply to procedures barring further prosecution 
in which no court is involved, did not convince the ECJ. The ECJ did not find 
any obstacle in the Articles 55 and 58, and considered the intentions of the 
Contracting Parties to be irrelevant, since they predate the integration of the 
Schengen acquis in the EU. With regard to the Belgian Government’s 
argument about possible prejudice to the rights of the victims, the ECJ 
followed the view of the Advocate General, stressing that the victim’s right to 
bring civil actions is not precluded by the application of the ne bis in idem 
principle. 
 
For that reason the ECJ ruled that: 
 
 ‘The ne bis in idem principle, laid down in Article 54 of the Convention implementing the 
Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the 
Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on 
the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, signed on 19 June 1990 at 
Schengen, also applies to procedures whereby further prosecution is barred, such as the 
procedures at issue in the main actions, by which the Public Prosecutor of a Member State 
discontinues criminal proceedings brought in that State, without the involvement of a court, 
once the accused has fulfilled certain obligations and, in particular, has paid a certain sum 
of money determined by the Public Prosecutor’. 
 
4.5  The ne bis in idem as an autonomous general principle of Union law44 
 
The ECJ states explicitly that the area of freedom, security and justice implies 
mutual trust in each other’s criminal justice systems, and that the validity of 
the ne bis in idem principle is not dependent upon further harmonization. The 
ECJ considers also that the intentions of the Contracting Schengen Parties 
are of no value anymore, since they predate the integration of the Schengen 
acquis in the EU. This is as such remarkable, since the Dutch proposal45 at 
                                                          
44 For other comments in literature see M. Rübenstahl & U. Krämer, European Law Reporter 4/2003, 
177-185; K. Adomeit, NJW, 2003, 1162-1164; M. Fletcher, The Modern Law Review, 2003, 769-
780; O. Plöckinger, Österreichische Juristenzeitung, vol 58, 2003, 98-101; N. Thwaites, Revue de 
Droit de l´Union Européenne, vol. 1, 2002, 295-298; J. Vogel, ‘Europäisches ne bis in idem’, - 
EuGH, NJW, 2003, 1173. 
45 As provided for under Article 68 par 3 of the Dutch Criminal Code.  
 26
the time of the conception of Article 54 to include out-of-court transactie 
settlements was rejected. The intention of the Contracting Parties to preclude 
transacties from the ne bis in idem principle was very clear. However, the 
integration of the Schengen provisions in the EU, based upon the decision of 
the IGC and ratified by the national authorities did not only change the 
conceptual framework of these provisions, but also the meaning and effect. A 
parallel can be drawn here with the general principles of Community law in the 
internal market. Community loyalty and non-discrimination, for example, had 
consequences for the meaning and effect of several national criminal 
provisions, not taking into account the intent of the national legislative power. 
 It is typical for an integrated legal order like the EC that the conceptual 
framework of European integration interferes with national sovereignty, also 
concerning cooperation and transnational aspects.46 What happened in the 
integration of the market in the EC is now being repeated in the integration of 
justice in the EU. Rights and remedies for the market citizen are transformed 
into rights and remedies for the Union citizen. National decisions, including 
criminal justice decisions, can have an EU-wide effect in a new setting of 
European territoriality. The ECJ ruling on the ne bis in idem principle clearly 
shows that general principles of Union law can reshape the concept and 
substance of Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. This is also 
what makes the European integration process so different from the dual 
sovereignty in the USA, where the constitutional double jeopardy does not bar 
prosecution in more than one state. When a defendant in a single act violates 
the ‘peace and dignity’ of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, in the 
USA he will have committed two distinct offences47 with two different 
standards to protect. In the EU there is but a single Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice and an integrated legal order in which full effect should be given 
to fundamental standards. 
 However, with this decision the ECJ has not solved all the problems of the 
ne bis in idem principle. As mentioned, the interpretation of final judgment is 
only one of the problem points. If the legislator does not intervene in due time, 
                                                          
46 See e.g. Judgment of the Court of 2 February 1989. Ian William Cowan v. Trésor public. Case 
186/87, ECR 1989, p. 00195.  
47 Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985).  
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the ECJ will certainly receive other references for preliminary rulings 
concerning the interpretation of the ne bis in idem principle. Questions that 
remain fully on the agenda are of course the problems concerning the 
definitions of idem and bis and the scope of the principle of ne bis in idem. In 
the joined cases discussed above the ECJ speaks of the discontinuance of 
‘(…) criminal proceedings brought in that State, without the involvement of a 
court, once the accused has fulfilled certain obligations and, in particular, has 
paid a certain sum of money determined by the Public Prosecutor’, which is 
worded much wider than the formulation of the Advocate General who spoke 
of conditions with the nature of a penalty, a decision of guilt, and no prejudice 
to victims. More concretely, the question is thus whether procedural 
agreements, such as plea bargaining or full or partial immunity deals for 
collaboration with the law enforcement authorities fall under the scope of the 
ne bis in idem principle. In some countries such deals may be connected to 
an out-of-court settlement in the form of a transactie. Another problem is the 
full application of the ne bis in idem rule if the first proceedings were held for 
the very purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal 
responsibility. Under which conditions can the ne bis in idem principle be set 
aside and by whom? 
 In this light it is important to underline that a couple of days after the ECJ 
ruling in the Gözütok and Brügge case, Greece submitted a proposal for a 
framework decision on ne bis in idem48 with the aim of establishing common 
legal rules in order to ensure uniformity in both the interpretation of those 
rules and their practical implementation. The framework decision would 
replace the Articles 54-58 CISA. The proposal defines criminal offences 
(Article 1) as: offences sensu strictu and administrative offences or breaches 
punished with an administrative fine on the condition that the appeal 
procedure is before a criminal court. Judgments also include any extrajudicial 
mediated settlements in a criminal matter and any decisions which have the 
status of res judicata under national law shall be considered as final. Article 4 
provides for exceptions to the ne bis in idem principle if the acts to which the 
foreign judgment relates constitute offences against the security or other 
                                                          
48 Initiative of the Hellenic Republic with a view to adopting a Council Framework Decision concerning 
the application of the ‘ne bis in idem’ principle, OJ C 2003 100/4. 
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equally essential interests of that Member State or were committed by a civil 
servant of the Member State in breach of his official duties. Article 3 contains 
a consultation procedure and jurisdiction rules in order to avoid double 
prosecution. The Greek initiative can only be applauded, but unfortunately the 
scope of its proposal is too narrow. In fact, excluding punitive administrative 
sanctions if not appealable before a criminal court is quite absurd, also in the 
light of the ECHR case law, even though it does fit the German tradition of 
administrative criminal law (Ordnungswidrigkeiten). The draft also contains far 
too many exceptions to the ne bis in idem rule. Finally, the draft does not deal 
with the applicability to legal persons. The discussions in the Council are 
underway but prove quite difficult on several points, including on the issues at 
stake in the Gözütok and Brügge case. 
 With the ongoing fast elaboration of legal instruments in the field of JHA, 
both for reinforcing the efficiency of criminal justice in the European territory 
(the European arrest warrant, the European confiscation order, drafts for the 
European evidence warrant and the European search and seizure order) and 
for increasing the legal protection for the citizen (protection of the victims of 
crime, the Green Paper on the procedural safeguards for suspects), it is clear 
that the ECJ will be quite busy in the near future establishing guiding 
principles of criminal justice in the European judicial area in criminal matters. 
The Gözütok and Brügge judgment on ne bis in idem is only the beginning of 
the important role which the ECJ has to play in the area of European criminal 
justice. All this illustrates that there is a real need to sign and ratify the 
Constitution, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR)49 as a 
binding legal text. The CFR refers to the ECHR as the minimum standard, and 
under the proposed Constitution the EU would also become party to the 
ECHR. The scope of Article 50 CFR, which appears as Article II-110 in the 
Constitutional Treaty of the Union,50 dealing with ne bis in idem is fully 
transnational in the EU, but due the wording of the text its scope of application 
can be called disappointing: ‘No one shall be liable to be tried or punished 
                                                          
49 Proclaimed in Nice in December 2000, but not legally binding.  
50 Council of the EU, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Explanations relating to 




again in criminal proceedings of an offence for which he or she has already 
been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance with the 
law’. By insisting so much on criminal proceed ings, this text is not even in line 
with the present case law of the ECHR. Moreover, the provision seems to 
deal only with final judgments. 
 For this reason the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Cri-
minal Law set up an expert group to elaborate the so-called Freiburg Proposal 
on Concurrent Jurisdictions and the Prohibition on Multiple Prosecutions in 
the EU.51 The text deals with preventing multiple prosecutions in international 
cases by the imposition of forum/jurisdiction rules, the application of 
transnational ne bis in idem and finally, as a safety net, the application of the 
accounting principle. Concerning the transnational ne bis in idem rule, the 
expert group proposes a ne bis in idem factum right for natural and legal 
persons. The ne bis in idem rule should apply to all punitive procedures and 
sanctions, whether of an administrative or a criminal law nature, whether 
national or European. The proposal uses the term ‘finally disposed of’ instead 
of ‘finally acquitted or convicted’. This terminology includes every decision 
taken by prosecution authorities, which terminates the proceedings in a way 
that makes reopening of the case subject to exceptional substantial 
circumstances. This definition includes, for example, the German or Dutch 
out-of-court settlements (Einstellung gegen Auflagen, transactie) and the 
French ordonnance de non-lieu moitivée en fait as falling within the scope of 
the ne bis in idem principle. 
 This proposal provides an excellent set of provisions de lege lata, both for 
the legislator and for the judiciary, and both at the European and at the 
national level. 
 
 B. INTERPRETATION IN CONFORMITY WITH FRAMEWORK DECISIONS AND UNION 
LOYALTY 
 
The Council has frequently been criticized for neglecting the due process 
aspects of criminal justice by giving too much attention to effective 
                                                          
51 http://www.iuscrim.mpg.de/forsch/straf/projekte/nebisinidem.html. 
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enforcement.52 In the Tampere meeting of the Heads of State on Justice and 
Home Affairs attention was also expressly given to the rights of parties to 
criminal proceedings, including victims. In 2001, the Council adopted a 
framework decision on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings53 which 
required the Member States to approximate their laws and regulations to the 
extent necessary to attain the objective of affording victims a high level of 
protection. 
 
Article 2 contains obligations concerning respect and recognition of victims in 
the criminal justice system: 
 
 ‘1. Each Member State shall ensure that victims have a real and appropriate role in its 
criminal legal system. It shall continue to make every effort to ensure that victims are 
treated with due respect for the dignity of the individual during proceedings and shall 
recognize the rights and legitimate interests of victims with particular reference to criminal 
proceedings. 
2. Each Member State shall ensure that victims who are particularly vulnerable can benefit 
from specific treatment best suited to their circumstances.’ 
 
Article 3 contains specific obligations concerning victims as witnesses: 
 
 ‘Each Member State shall safeguard the possibility for victims to be heard during 
proceedings and to supply evidence. 
Each Member State shall take appropriate measures to ensure that its authorities question 
victims only insofar as necessary for the purpose of criminal proceedings’. 
 
Finally, Article 8(4) prescribes certain procedural measures of special 
protection: 
 
 ‘Each Member State shall ensure that, where there is a need to protect victims - 
particularly those most vulnerable - from the effects of giving evidence in open court, 
victims may, be decision taken by the court, be entitled to testify in a manner which will 
enable this objective to be achieved, by any appropriate means compatible with its basic 
legal principles’. 
                                                          
52 See contribution by C. Brants. 
53 OJ l 82/1. 
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In the case Criminal Procedure against Maria Pupino54 the criminal court of 
Florence referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling under Article 35 EU on 
the interpretation of the framework decision on the standing of victims in 
criminal proceedings, based upon Articles 31 and 34 EU. This was the first 
preliminary ruling on a framework decision. 
 The facts of the case were quite simple. Mrs Pupino, who worked as a 
teacher in a kindergarten, was charged for severely disciplining and injuring 
children. Eight children were victims of Mrs Pupino’s abuse and had to testify 
during the trial. The Public Prosecutor had asked the court for permission to 
hear these children as witnesses prior to the trial in in camera proceedings. 
The defence had objected to this. As a rule, Italian criminal proceedings are 
based on the principle of immediacy, meaning that all evidence has to be 
presented orally to the court during the hearings. Article 392(1) of the Criminal 
Code, however, provides for a strict number of exceptions, especially in the 
case of sexual offences. The case at hand did not, however, concern sexual 
acts. The court in principle rejected the Public Prosecutor’s request, but 
expressed doubts as to whether the Italian rules were in fact in conformity 
with the framework decision on the standing of victims in criminal 
proceedings, which requires that special protection is granted to all vulnerable 
victims. The court’s questions concerned the possibility and the limits of 
interpreting Italian law in conformity with the framework decision. 
 At the time of writing, only the Opinion of AG J. Kokott has yet been pub-
lished. First of all, she gives short shrift to the arguments of Sweden, Italy and 
the United Kingdom, stating that framework decisions are part of international 
public law and cannot contain the obligation for national courts, based on 
European Union law, to interpret national law in conformity with EU law. The 
AG is of the opinion that sufficient parallels can be drawn between Article 
34(2b) and Article 249(3). Even if the EU Treaty does not provide a parallel 
provision to Article 10 EC, Member States still have an obligation of loyalty to 
the Union. The AG derives this from Article 1 EU and from Title VI of the EU 
Treaty. She accepts the reasoning of the abovementioned Member States 
                                                          
54 Case C-105/03. 
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that the third pillar shows a lower degree of integration than the first pillar. 
However, she also underlines that Article 1 EU calls for an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe and that the Union shall be founded on the 
European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of 
cooperation established by the EU Treaty. In her vision this includes that the 
policies in the field of the third pillar are not only based on intergovernmental 
cooperation, but also on a common exercise of sovereignty by the Union, by 




From the examination of the as yet limited case law it has in any event 
become clear that the Court of Justice is well able to draw the outlines of legal 
guarantees in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Judicial acts which 
considerably limit the rights and freedoms of the citizen, such as is the case 
with arrest for the purpose of extradition, should be linked to a procedure 
before the Court of Justice which yields quick results. For this reason, it is 
recommended that the Statute of the Court of Justice is amended by providing 
for urgent proceedings and for specialized Court sections. The successor to 
the Tampere programme, the The Hague programme, has meanwhile also 
formulated an instruction for the European Commission in that sense which is 
to examine and elaborate the idea further in cooperation with the Court of 
Justice. 
 The Court of Justice deserves an opportunity to make its essential contribu-
tion to the harmonization of criminal law and criminal procedural law and to 
the further definition of constitutionality in transnational relations. Only in this 
way a foundation can be laid for mutual trust in each other’s legal systems 
and legal acts, a mutual trust that is based on the quality of the administration 
of justice and on respect for the rule of law. This mutual trust is not simply as-
sumed to exist, but needs to be earned on the basis of the quality of the 
dispensation of justice. For this reason, the key concept of mutual recognition 
cannot be based on inter-state non-inquiry or comity. Judicial authorities in the 
Member States must be able to scrutinize the lawfulness and legitimacy of 
judicial requests of other Member States. The ECJ must elaborate the 
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parameters for this review, by elaborating general principles of Union law in 
the field of transnational criminal procedure. 
 On the other hand, the Member States must grant the citizens of Europe 
the rights which they are entitled to and guarantee them Europe-wide. To hide 
behind outdated notions of sovereignty and intergovernmental structures 
which leave the citizen out in the cold is no longer defensible. For this reason, 
it is also regrettable that the future Constitutional Treaty has not completely 
eradicated the doctrine of the actes de gouvernement. In fact, the 
Constitutional Treaty has actually removed an even greater number of acts of 
enforcement bodies from the ECJ’s jurisdiction. In Article III-377, it is said that: 
 
 ‘In exercising its powers regarding the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of Chapter IV of 
Title III relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union shall have no jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of 
operations carried out by the police or other law-enforcement services of a Member State 
or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the 
maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security’. 
 
However, Article III-283 of the Convention stated that: 
 
 ‘In exercising its competences regarding the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of Chapter 
IV of Title III concerning to the area of freedom, security and justice, the Court of Justice 
shall have no jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of operations carried out 
by the police or other law-enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the 
responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and 
order and the safeguarding of internal security, where such action is a matter of national 
law’ (italics added). 
 
The wording of the Constitutional Treaty therefore not only rules out the 
judicial testing of acts of national enforcement agencies, but also of supra-
national enforcement bodies. Given the growing powers of Europol and Euro-
just and the possible expansion of the joint investigation teams and given the 
legal basis for a European Public Prosecutor this is extremely unfortunate. 
 Only if we recognize that the Union and the Member States exercise 
shared, common sovereignty, it will be possible to acknowledge that there is 
also room for shared, common European dispensation of criminal justice. 
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Based on the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Court of 
Justice in cooperation with the national judicial authorities may arrive at a set 
of general Union principles of law which are directional in the regulation of the 
constitutional state at the Union level, coupled with transnational legal 
protection worthy of that name. Only then will the Union have succeeded in 
achieving the depth vis-à-vis the ECHR which it aspires to accomplish through 
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